Life .. Functional Theories of Life

Fred Feldman Introductory Comments
On a beauciful fall day in 1990, my wife, my daughter, and I went for a walk on a very pretty hill near our home. As we were coming down the hill, I noticed a garter snake by the side of the path. I pointed this out to my wife and daughter. The snake was quite motionless. My daughter asked, 'is it alive?' I nudged the snake with the toe of my shoe. It did nor move. I suspect that it was dead.
Imagine a scene at NASA headquarcers. Suppose some TV images are bei.ng received from the Viking Lander which has landed on Mars. Suppose that a blurry object is seen in certain of the piccures. The object looks something like a colony of lichen or fu ngus growing on some rocks. On the other hand, it might just be some dust. or perhaps a discoloration on the surface of the rocks. The NASA engineers are fasc inated. One asks, 'Do you think it might be alive?' Another answers, ' No, that's not alive. It's just a patch of mineral discoloration on the surface of those rocks. There are similar rocks on earth. ' Imagine a trip to Disneyland. A small child is amazed by a roaring, tooth,gnashing, lifelike robot dinosaur. He fe ars that it might be real. He asks his parents whether the dinosaur is alive. They assure him that it is only a machine. It is not alive.
Imagine a high school biology class. A cold, limp frog lies on the lab table. The students gather around. The instructor attaches two wires to the frog. The other ends of the wires are attached to small battery. When a switch is closed, the frog twitches. The students are startled and some jump back. One student asks whether the frog is alive. The instructor explains that the frog is not alive, but electrical stimulation of the nerves in the big leg muscles still make the muscles contract. That's why the frog moved.
In all these cases, and in countless others relevantly like them, someone uses the word 'alive'. When they ask these questions, or make these assertions, the speakers presumably take themselves to understand what they have said. Others -the ones who hear their questions or statements -presumably also take themselves to understand what has been asked or said. They think they understand what the word 'alive' means.
Of course, if we look at the matter from a certain perspective, the presumption is true enough. We all know how to use the word 'alive', and we all have some vague grasp of some of the ways in which living things commonJy differ from nonliving ones. However, if we look at the matter from another perspective, I think we have to conclude that we don't know what 'alive' means. More exactly, my point is that none of us can give a clear and precise account of what the word 'alive' means. Strictly, then, I chink we do not know precisely what we mean when we ask whether something is alive, or when we say that something is alive. I chink none of us has grasped the concept of life explicitly.
Many philosophers and biologists have attempted to explain what 'alive' means. I will not attempt in this paper to discuss all the views that have been proposed. There are too many of them. Instead, I will focus on a few members of one influential fa mily of such accounts. These accounts have this in common: in each case, it is alleged that we can explain what we mean when we say that something is alive by mentioning something about some so,called "life functions ." Thus, I will be discussing some life, fu nctional 1explanations of life.
A Distinction
In order to make my topic clearer, I should distinguish it from another topic with which it may easily be confused. There is, on the one hand, an empirical, scientific question about the common properties distinctive of actual living organisms here on earth. To find the answer to this question, one would have to identify all the main kinds of living things on earth, and one would have to examine them closely to discover whether there is in fact some fe ature they all share. One would then have to consider whether these fe atures are disti nctive of living things. In other words, one would have to determine that only living things have the common fe atures.
Suppose some microbiologist discovered that all and only actual living things on earth have certain microbiological fe atures X, Y, and Z. She could then say that all and only living things here on earth have fe atures X, Y, and z. That might answer this biological question. But note that such a claim would at best be contingent. No matter what X, Y, and Z might be, even the microbiologist would admit that it is still possible that there might be living things elsewhere that lack X, Y, and Z. The mi crobiologist surely would also admit that if life on earth had evolved in some other way, living things here mi ght have lacked X, Y, and Z. So the answer co this first question is at best empirical, contingent, and restricted to "life as we know . "
lt .
I mean to be discussing a much more fu ndamental question. My question is not a question in biology, to be answered by careful study of actual living things here on earth. My question is a question about the concept of life itself. It is a philosophical question, rather than a biological one. A satisfactory answer to my question would not be contingent or empirical. It would be a necessary truth, telling us something about the concepc of life icself. Those raised in the analytic tradition mighc hope that the answer co this questi on would appear in the fonn of a philosophical analysis of the concepc of life, or a definiti on of 'x is alive ac t '. Of course, it is noc essential chac the answer should cake precisely this form. It is the concenc of the answer, not the form, chac macters.
Suppose we decide in the end 'alive' means 'has features A, B. and C. If chis accounc of the meaning of 'alive' is correct, then not only on earth, but everywhere in the universe. chings chac are alive must have fe atures A. B, and C. Funhermore, if the account is correct. then there is no conceiv, able way in which evoluti on could have progressed in which living things would have lacked A. B, and C. This is not shocking. For, if the account of meaning is correct, chen, when we say that these things would have been alive, all we mean is that they would have had fe atures A, B, and C. Obviously, then, there couldn't be a living thing without the specified fe atures.
So my question will not be answered by some contingent, empirical stacement about living things as we know them. It will be answered by a necessary, conceptual statement about living things. of whatever possible sort.
Wfiy Ask This Question?
There are several independent reasons for taking this question seriously.
One of these concerns the status of biology as a unitary science. Tradition, ally, biology has been defined as the science of life. The main thing that ties all branches of biology together is that they are all various ways of studying living things. If it should tum out that living things have nothing in common, then biology would lose its claim to be a single science.
·
A second reason to enquire into the nature of life itself is prompted by recent interest in exobiology. When NASA designed a space probe to search for life on other planets, they did not design the probe merely to react to "life as we know it". The probe had to be designed in such a way as to recognize life even in forms quite different from those with which we are familiar here on earth. NASA engineers obviously recognized that life itself is not restricted to the earthly forms. Living things mi ght appear in all sorts of forms -some might even be so bizarre that no one at NASA could anticipate their details.
I can imagine some NASA engineers puzzled about their proj ect. 11We want to design a probe that will react to life in whatever form it might take. We can't anticipate the details of all possible forms. So what are we looking for? What do we mean when we say we are looking for li fe?" Thus, an interest in exobiology might provoke an interest in our philosophical question.
A third possible reason to be interested in life is a moral reason. Some chink that there is a moral reason to respect life; that living things have a special sort of value. Surely it would be mere planetary chauvinism to accord this value only to life as we know it on earth. Ef life itself is valuable , then life of all sorts -even sorts we cannot imagine -is valuable. So if we chink that life itself is valuable, we may want to enquire into the nature of life. If we don't know what life itself is, then this moral doctrine is to a certain extent empty. We say that living things are valuable, but we don't know precisely which things we are thereby praising.
My own view is that the enquiry into the nature of life needs no justification. Philosophers enquire into the nature of knowledge, causation, beauty, obligation, justice, etc. Since the concept of life is at least as interesting and important as these other concepts, it is appropriate that philosophers seek to understand it, too. The search need not be premised on some pragmatic payoff. Of course, if there is a fu rther, pragmatic justifi cation for our enquiry, then so much the better. My point is that the enquiry needs no such justification. Like all serious philosophy, it is intrinsically worthwhile.
In any case, let us turn to some proposed answers to our question about the nature of life.
Ufe Functionalism
If you turn to the first chapter of a typical high school or college biology textboo k, you will almost certainly fi nd a discussion of our question. And in virtually every case, the question wi ll be answered by appeal to a list of "life functions". So, for example, in Chapter One of my younger daughter's 10th grade biology textbook1, we find a list mentioning these life functions:
1. Nutrition , converting materials from the environment into forms the organism can use.
2. Transport , moving usable materials from one part of the organism to another.
Respiration , releasing chemical energy from nutrients.
4. Synthesis and assimilation , combining simple substances so as to make more complex ones. 5. Growth , increasing in size. 6. Excretion , getting rid of wastes.
7. Regulation , maintaining a stable internal environment.
8. Reproduction , producing new organisms.
9. Metabolism , seems to be a combination of 1, 3, 4.
In the first chapter of my older daughter's college level textbook, we find a significantly different list. In answer to the question, 'what charac teristics do all living things have in common?', the authors of that boo k say:
... all are chemically complex and highly organized. All use energy (metabolize ). organize themselves (develop), and reproduce. All change (e\'olve) over generations. So far as we know. no nonli\·ing thing possesses all these attributes. In addition. and perhaps most important, only the living organism has a set of instructions, or "pro, gram'' resident in its genes, that directs its metabolism, organization, and reproduction, and is the raw material upon which evolution acts.� In Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought, there is a section entitled "Special Characcerisrics of Living Organisms. "3 Mayr asserts that 'the process of living can be defined.' He proceeds to mention a number of characteristics that, according to him, 'are not or not in the same manner found in inanimate objects.' His list includes the following items:
I. Complexity and organization. I find a certain feature of these three lists astonishing. In order to make this fe ature more obvious, I have constructed a chart that presents a condensed formulation of the information contained in the lists. In the chart, 'S&S' indicates Schraer and Stoltze, 'K&G' indicates Keeton and Gould. An 'x' indicates that the author mentioned at the top of the column claims that the life function at the left of the row is partially definitive of life. 
Even this very brief glimpse of just three respectable texts in biology should make one fact clear. Modern life, functionalists are in wild disagreement about which properties are the life functions. Schraer and Stoltze agree with Keeton and Gould on two items; they disagree on eleven. The list provided by Mayr contains eight items. Not one of these appears in the Schraer and Stouze list. Only three appear in the Keeton and Gould list.
Another puzzling fe ature of these lists is this: each of the authors cited suggests in some passages that each of the relevant life functions is necessary for life, and that they are jointly sufficient. However, each of the authors also remarks that there are borderline cases, and that ther1e are exceptions. So, it is not clear that any of these authors was in fact attempt, ing to answer our question. Indeed, in light of the remarks about exceptions and borderline cases, it is not entirely clear what question they were trying to answer.
Perhaps it would be a good idea, then, to begin at the beginning. Let us start by considering one of the oldest and most distinguished versions of the life functional approach. This is the version presented by a man who was both the first great biologist and one of the first great philosophersAristotle. l. Nutrition: the capacity co get food. absorb it into oneself. and thereby to grow. Surprisingly. Aristotle maintain:s that nutrition is insepa rable from reproduction; that these are both functions of the same "soul" -the nutritive soul. 'Nutrition and reproduction are due co one and the same psychic power.'; Reproduction is the capacity ro prod uce offspring.
Aristotle maintains that the capacity co engage in nutrition is the most basic and widely distributed life func tion.:-His view seems to be that every living thing, plane or animal, has chis capacity; no nonliving thing has it.
Thus, apparently according to Aristotle, a thing is alive if and only if it can engage in nutrition and reproduction. A few comments may be in order. First, it is imrx>rtanc to recognize that Aristotle views nutrition and reproduction as functions of the same "soul" -the nutritive. Furthermore, he explicitly acknowledges18 that there are many cases in which individual plants and animals are incapable of engaging in reproduction. Thus, I have asterisked the 'yes' in each occur rence concerning reprod uction.
While the chart is surely suggestive, it does not yet constitute an answer to our fu ndamental question: 'What is Life ?' One natural answer, based on these Aristotelian ideas, would be this: lF l: xi s alive at t =df. xi s able to perform at least one of the life functions at t.
It seems to me, however, that there are very serious problems for LF l. One of these problems concerns motion. If we understand motion in a straight forward manner, we will have to say that any mechanical device that is capable of setting itself into motion displays this sort of life function. As a result, LF l seems to imply that natural objects such as tornadoes and volcanos, as well as artifacts such as alarm clocks, robots of various sorts, automatic lawn sprinkling devices, etc. are all alive.
Reproduction raises some interesting puzzles, too. Consider a dead tomato plant hanging forlornly in the frozen garden of some careless gardener who forgot to clean up after the fall frosts. That plant surely is not alive. Yet, there are seeds in the shriveled tomatoes. When spring comes, those seeds may germinate, giving rise to a whole flock of baby tomato plants. My question is this: is the tomato plant capable of perform, ing the li fe function called 'reproduction'? If so, then LF 1 implies that it is still alive. If not, then how can this be squared with the fact that it still has the capacity to produce a flock of seedlings in the spring?
Aristotle himself seems to have been particularly impressed by the apparent universality of the nutritive soul. In a widely quoted passage, he says:
This I the power of self-nutririon] is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as litiing ar all... 1Q
And in another just a few paragraphs later we find:
... first o( all we must treat of nutrition and reprod uction, for the nmritive soul i found along with all the others and is the most primirive and widely disrrihured power of soul, being indeed char one in virrue of which all are said to have life. The acts in which it manifests itself are reproduction and the use of food ... z\I
On one interpretation, Arisrotle might be taken co be maintaining thi!' view about life itself:
LFZ: x is alive at t =df. xi s able to engage in nucrition and reproduction at t.
Obviously, however, this won't do. As Aristotle himself pointed out, very many living things cannot engage in reproducrion. 21 He cites rlhree sons of cases in which living things lack the capacity co reproduce. Some cannot reproduce because they are too young. (I suppose we could add char some cannot reproduce because they are too old.) He goes on to mention organisms that ar,e "mutilated". Finally, he mentions organisms whose mode of reproduction is spontaneous. Aristotle seems to have thought that some creatures are produced by spontaneous generation, and don't have to bother with reproduction. Be this as it may, the first two points are surely conclusive. Lots of things cannot engage in reprod uction even though they are alive. Thus, LF2 is clearly wrong. We could modify LFZ merely by deleting the second conjunct. This would yield:
LF3: x is alive at t =df. x is able to engage in nutrition at t.
Aristotle devotes several pages to his discussion of nutrition. He presents a fascinating discussion of the analysis of the concept of "food ", and he talks about the nature of growth. In the end, however, stripped of complexities, his view seems to be this: a creature can engage in nutrition at a time if and only if it is able at that time to acquire some food, absorb that food and make it part of itself, and as a result, grow and have the energy needed to do what needs co be done.
By way of criticism of LF3, I here quote at length a moving passage fTom
The Nature of living Things by C. Brooke Worth and Robe rt K. Enders.
Worth and Ender have been describing an experimenc with a cecrop1a moch. Shortly after the moth emerged from irs pupal shell, Worth and Enders tied a rring around its waist and placed it outdoor where a male could find it. According ro their account. a male did find the much:
Copulation lasts through the day. In the evening we untether the fe male and put her in a shoe box for an hour or so. By this time she has laid fifty eggs, So we let her go. For the next few nights she will doc the rest of her eggs, some two or three hundred, on various trees. What then? Already her gorgeous wings are a bit tattered. Her abdomen has shrunk and she is beginning to tremble. But naturally! She has been so busy that food has been forgotten. Now she is faced with tragedy greater than one would suspect, for her entire race has forgotten about foo d. The caterpillar's digestive tract, taken to bed in the pupa's interior, was completely demolished during moth,formation, but no substitute was provided. So here flits the cecropia, completely absolved of her responsibilities to posterity, but unable to taste the rewards of accomplishment. No mouth, no stomach -only a small additional reserve of stored energy. The moth flies about bright lights for a few evenings more but then falls ragged and quivering to the ground, where ants slowly extinguish the rest of its waning life.12
The case of the cecropia moth demonstrates, I chink, that a creature can be alive at a time even though it is not then able to engage in nutri, tion. Other examples come to mind. While undergoing abdominal surgery, a person's digestive system might be temporarily detached and "shut down". Furthermore, the patient himself might be unconscious and paralyzed. Though the patient is clearly alive, he cannot acquire any food (because he's paralyzed and unconsci ous) and he cannot absorb any food (because his intestines are detached). As it stands, LF 3 is unsatisfactory.
It should be obvious that we cannot modify LF3 in anything like this way:
LF3': x is alive at t =df. either (i) x is able to engage in nutrition at t, or else (ii) x was able to engage in nutrition at some time earlier than t.
The problem with LF3' is that nearly every dead organism satisfies the second disjunct of the definiens. Corpses are nonliving things that fo rmerly were able to engage in nutrition.
le seems clear, then, that Anscocle's version of the life-functional approach suffers from some prett)' serious problems. Perhaps rwo thousand years of biological researc h has prm·ided the basis for a more plausible formulation. Let us therefore consider some t)'Pical modem examples of the life-functional approach co the analysis of the concept of lifo.
In Philosophy: An lmroduccion to the Art of Won dering, James Christian says:
At present, it appears that "life" can be defined with two qualities: self-replication and mutability. Any organism possessing these two qualities can be considered alive. In these two characteristics is conrained the essential processes of evolution: continuity and adaptation . ... But mutability -the ability co effect changes from one generation co another and adapt to a fluid environment -is essential. Without the ability to change and adapc no species could long survive. Environmental conditions are forever changing; species must be able to change along with their environments. So far as we know, only living organisms have these two qualities, and an organism must possess both qualities to be considered alive.23
Since Christian is a philosopher, and not a biologist, it might seem that his views are not worthy of consideration here. Thus, it is interesting to compare Christian's view with a view presented in a college-level biology textbook written by my good friend, Richard Goldsby. Goldsby is a respected biologisc. Goldsby mentions che exobiologists at NASA and their reflections on the nature of life. Goldsby reports:
These scientists have tried to reduce the functional definition of life to the most simple, general, and abstract criteria. Their conclusion is that only two characteristics distinguish livi ng entities from inanimate nature: the ability to reproduce themselves, and the means of producing and perpetuating genetic variations among the offs pring. 24 Goldsby goes on to claim that this very abstract definition of life has certain corollaries. In order to reproduce, an organism has to stay alive at least for a little while. This requires metabolism (the ability to "absorb, transform, and use material from the environment") and adaptation (the ability to make useful, genuinely "homeostatic" respon es co changes in the environment). Christian also mentions these other life fu nctions=> along with a few others, but it isn't clear that he views them as "corollaries" of the core definiti on.
Thus it appears that NASA (at least according to Goldsby) and Christian would agree that life itself can be defined as follows: LF4: xi s alive at t =df. x is able to reproduce at t & x is able to produce and perpetuate genetic variation among offspring at c.
The influence of Charles Darwin is obvious in this account of life. As both Christian and Goldsby point out, this analysis of the concept of life very naturally leads to the conclusion that Hving things will be able to evolve as their environment changes (so long as the environment changes at a suitable rate, and the mutations occur at a suitable rate). In virtue of this emphasis, this sort of analysis is sometimes called '"the genetic analysis of life". It is nowadays quite popular with philosophers and biologists.
Neverthe·less it is clear that, as it stands, LF4 won't work. As we have already noted, lots of living things are unable to reproduce. In some cases, infertility is only temporary, but in other cases it is permanent and life, long. Among ants and bees, for example, many living individuals are permanently sterile. The same holds true for certain hybrids, such as mules. Obviously, if a thing can't produce offspring at all, then it surely cannot produce offspring manifesting genetic variations from itself. Thus, each conjuct of the the proposed analysis of life is clearly too narrow, and the analysis itself fails.
Two .. tiered Views
One natural modification of LF4 suggests itself. We must distinguish between the concrete, individual organism ("this particular mosquito , the one that just bit my ear") and the species (in this case, I suspect, Culex pipiens). Living individuals may be unable to reproduce. But, as a number of authors going back to Aristotle have remarked, a viable species must have some standard method (or methods) of reproduction. Typical adult, unmutilated instances of the species generally reproduce in the method standard for the species.
In the case of variation, the focus on the species rather than the individual is even more obvious. It makes virtually no sense to say that an individual mosquito undergoes genetic variation from generation to generation. The individual has the same genetic makeup chroughou t its existence, and is a member of exactly one generation, no matter how long it lives. However, it does make sense to say that a species undergoes genetic variation from generation to generation. Roughly, what chis means is chat indi viduals of one generation are genetically different from individuals of other generations.
In order to simplify our discussion, let us introouce some convenient abbreviations. We can say that a species is reproductive just in case there i s a methoo of reproouction such that typical members of that species reproouce by that method. Thus, the ameba is reproouctive because t ypical members undergo fission; the tomato is reproouctive because typical members produce viable seeds; the lion is reproouctive because males inseminate females who then carry their cubs to term; etc. Going beyond this, we can say that a species is variably reproductive just in case it is reproductive, and fu rthermore individuals of one generation are capable of producing offspring that manifest small genetic differences from their parents. We need not attempt to defi ne what is meant by 'small' genetic differences. Making use of these abbreviations, and taking note of the distinction between species and individuals, we could replace LF4 with: LFS: xi s alive at t =df. xi s a member of some variably reproductive species at t.
The advantage of LFS over LF4 is clear. Immature, "mutilated", and post, reproductive individuals are not counterexamples to LFS. Such individuals are counted as living, not because they can reproduce, but because they are members of reproductive species. Furthermore, sterile ants and bees also count as alive on LFS, since they are members of variably reproductive species. Their own sterility is here irre levant. Unfortunately, a moment's reflection will reveal that LFScasts the net of life much too widely. It correctly counts the senile as alive; it incorrectly counts the deceased as alive. A dead chicken is still a chicken; it is still a member of a variably reproductive species. LFS therefore tells us that each such chicken is still alive. Someone might insist, as a sort of desperate defensive maneuver, that a dead chicken is really not a chicken. Such a person might claim that the corpse of a member of a species is not itself a member of that species. This seems to me to be wrong. If we refl ect for a moment on the activities of taxonomists, its wrongheadedness will become even clearer. The typical entomological taxonomist, for example, does virtually all of her work with dead specimens. She sorts individuals into species -but the individuals are rarely living. She points to her cases of dead butterflies and says, 'This is the Monarch; that is the Viceroy. Notice the difference in the pattern.' If the current proposal were correct, the taxonomist would be wrong. Strictly speaking, there would be no Monarchs or Viceroys in her case. Only a dedicated philosopher could say such a thing with a straight face.
This sort of approach gives rise to further profound difficulties. Perhaps the most intractable of these is this: LFS makes use of the notori ously obscuie concept of "species". In order to make LF5 fully ansfactory as a phiLosophicaJ analysis of the concepr of life, we would have to give some account of the concept of species, and that would be a most difficult ta k. However, if we insist on altering our concept of species in such a way that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, each species contains only livmg members, then the tas k becomes vastly more diffic ulc. Furthermore, as should be pretty obvious, the tas k presupposes a solution to our present problem. En order to define 'species', we would have first co define 'alive'.
Conclusion
In spite of its magnificent pedigree and its popularity, it seems to me that the life functional approach to the analysis of life is unsuccessful. I see no satisfactory way to define life by appeal to some set of 
